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We use a panel of 16 OECD countries over several decades to investigate the e ects of gov-
ernment debts and decits on long-term interest rates. In simple static specications, a
one-percentage-point increase in the primary decit relative to GDP increases contempora-
neous long-term interest rates by about 10 basis points. In a vector autoregression (VAR),
the same shock leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years. The
e ect of debt on interest rates is non-linear: only for countries with above-average levels of
debt does an increase in debt a ect the interest rate. World scal policy is also important: an
increase in total OECD-government borrowing increases each country’s interest rates. How-
ever, domestic scal policy continues to a ect domestic interest rates even after controlling
for worldwide debts and decits.1 Introduction
After years of ﬁscal consolidation in the 1990s, governments of many OECD coun-
tries have pursued more expansionary ﬁscal policies. During the past 5 years
(2002-06), the United States general government deﬁcit averaged 4 percent of GDP,
compared with a surplus of about 11
2 percent in 2000. Over the same period,
Japan’s deﬁcit averaged 63
4 percent of GDP, while Germany, France, and Italy
each ran deﬁcits averaging around 31
2 percent of GDP, and the United Kingdom
about 3 percent–all representing substantial easing in relation to the beginning of
the decade. Ofthe seven major advanced economies, only Canada bucked the trend,
moving from deﬁcit into surplus (International Monetary Fund (2006)).
One of the main concerns raised by governments’ increased ﬁscal laxity is its
possible effect on long-term interest rates. In standard macroeconomic models,
which assume some degree of short-run nominal stickiness, a weakening of the
primary ﬁscal balance in the ﬁrst instance contributes to aggregate demand1 and
leads to an increase in nominal and real interest rates, whether it is assumed that
the nominal money supply is given by policy (as in the textbook IS-LM model) or
that the monetary authorities follow a Taylor-like rule for adjusting interest rates in
response to changes in the output gap (Taylor 1993). While the immediate effect of
ﬁscal expansion is on short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates would also
be affected to the extent that deﬁcits are persistent and price adjustment gradual.
Deﬁcitsandgovernmentdebt mayalsoaffectrealinterestratesinthelongerrun
through a number of channels. First, to the extent that a ﬁscal expansion crowds
out private investment and results in a lower steady-state capital stock, it will be
associated with a higher marginal product of capital and thus a higher real interest
rate (Engen and Hubbard (2004)).2 This effect depends on the accumulation of past
and expected future ﬁscal deﬁcits; past deﬁcits are reﬂected in the current stock of
debtwhilepresentand(again, totheextentthatdeﬁcitsarepersistent)futuredeﬁcits
are represented in the current primary balance.3
1The existing stock of debt may also inﬂuence aggregate demand via wealth effects on aggregate
consumption.
2Such crowding out need not occur in case of Ricardian equivalence—which implies that a
deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cut or increase in transfers would be matched by a corresponding increase in
the present value of future taxes, with no effect on the time path of real private expenditure or, there-
fore, on equilibrium real interest rates or investment. While increased government expenditure on
goods and services may still affect real interest rates, consumption, and investment, any such effect
will be independent of whether that expenditure is ﬁnanced by taxation or government borrowing.
Deviations from Ricardian equivalence can occur for a number of reasons (Barro 1974), however,
and an extensive empirical literature suggests that this hypothesis does not hold in practice.
3See Marcet and Scott (2001) for evidence that the US government debt’s process is highly
persistent.A second possible effect of ﬁscal policy on interest rates is via any default risk
premium. Models of sovereign debt crises imply that default risk depends on the
existing stock of debt relative to the debtor’s income streams; the risk of default in
the future in that case also depends on future primary balances that contribute to
future debt levels.4
A third channel through which ﬁscal policy may affect nominal interest rates is
viaexpectedinﬂationand, in anopen-economycontext, currency depreciation. One
classofmodelsgivingrisetosucheffectsarethe“unpleasantmonetaristarithmetic”
of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the ﬁscal theory of the price level advanced by
Woodford (1995). In an open-economy context, some second-generation models
of currency crises imply that a large public debt makes the authorities less likely
to be prepared to tighten monetary policy to maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate (e.g.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)), thus increasing the probability that a crisis occurs;
crisis probability is reﬂected in turn in the interest rate spread. In addition to interest
rate spreads reﬂecting expectations of inﬂation and/or depreciation, there may be
risk premia associated with inﬂation or exchange rate uncertainty as shown by Dai
and Philippon (2005).
The effects of ﬁscal imbalances on interest rates have been the subject of an
extensive but hitherto inconclusive empirical literature and estimates of the impact
of debts and deﬁcits on interest rates vary widely.5 However, almost all of this
work is based on time series evidence from single countries, typically the US. This
suggeststhattheremaybesigniﬁcantbeneﬁtsfrombringingcross-countryevidence
to bear on this question. This is the goal of the present paper.
In this paper, we do not try to test different models nor to distinguish among the
several channels through which ﬁscal policy affects interest rates. Instead, we pro-
vide empirical evidence on the effects ofﬁscal policy on interest rates by estimating
reduced-form regressions. We examine the effects of ﬁscal policy on interest rates
4See for instance Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003). More generally, the literature
on the theory of sovereign debt (Eaton and Fernandez, 1995) analyzes the conditions under which
debt will be repaid; in most models, the amount borrowed and the interest rate are determined
endogenously as the solution to a repeated game, taking into account the possibility of repudiation
(e.g. Eaton and Gersowitz 1981). Another possible channel by which primary balances and debt
levels inﬂuence default probabilities is through signalling as in Drudi and Prati (2000).
5Coefﬁcients of ﬁscal policy variables in interest rates regressions span from being positive and
signiﬁcant to being insigniﬁcant. In section 3.7, we relate our estimates to some of the existent
empirical literature. For a more comprehensive, although still incomplete review, see Alesina et al.
(1992), Barro (1987), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), Barth et al. (1991), Blanchard and Summers
(1984), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), Evans (1985) and (1987), Feldstein (1986), Friedman
(2005), Gale and Orszag (2002) and (2004), Hoelscher (1986), Laubach (2003), Miller and Russek
(1991) and (1996), Orr et al. (1995), Paesani et al. (2006), Perotti (2002), Plosser (1987), Reinhart
and Sack (2000), and Tavares and Valkanov (2001).in a broad panel of 16 OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960
to 2002. The results indicate statistically and economically signiﬁcant effects of
ﬁscal imbalances on long-term interest rates. In our preferred speciﬁcation, a one
percentage point increase of the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio is associated with a
10-basis-point rise in the nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds. The
increase is larger when one also considers the effect that a positive shock to the
primary deﬁcit has on expected future ﬁscal policy and macro variables in the long-
run: in a dynamic VAR a one percentage point increase in the primary deﬁcit-to-
GDP ratio leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years.
In addition to the current deﬁcit, it is important to examine the implications
of changes in the stock of public debt. We ﬁnd that the effect is non-linear and
that the response of long-term interest rates is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
only when the stock of public debt is above a given threshold. While in a country
with a debt-to GDP ratio of 119 per cent (Italy in 2002) a one-standard-deviation
increase in government debt leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate on 10-
year government bonds of about 86 basis points, an increase by the same amount
where the public debt-to-GDP ratio is 58 percent (the US in 2002) leads to a 10
basis points increase in the interest rate.6
We also ﬁnd that a worsening of public ﬁnances abroad has an effect on na-
tional interest rates, which is evidence that OECD countries’ ﬁnancial markets are
tosomeextentinternationallyintegrated. However,thedegreeofglobalizationisfar
from complete: controlling for the average value of the primary deﬁcit and public
debt-to-GDP ratios across OECD countries, a shock to each country’s primary bal-
ance still affects national long-term interest rates.7 In a similar vein, we investigate
whether the impact of ﬁscal variables on interest rates is more severe in ﬁnancially
less developed countries, and we ﬁnd some evidence to this effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
the econometric technique used in the estimation. Section 3 investigates the relation
between ﬁscal policy and long-term interest rates in static models, tackles causality,
expands the empirical analysis of our benchmark speciﬁcations, checks the robust-
ness of the results, and discusses the relationship of the results to existing literature.
Section 4 presents estimates from dynamic VAR models. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
6Note, however, that the ratio of government debt-to-GDP has a standard deviation equal to 26
percent, henceaone-standard-deviationincreaseinthepublicdebtisquiteasubstantialchange. The
response of interest rates to a one percent change of the stock of public debt-to-GDP ratio would be
really minimal, even in countries with extreme low or high values of public debt.
7Besides incomplete ﬁnancial-market integration, differential government default risks may also
explain this result.2 Data and Method
In this section we describe the data we use in the empirical analysis, discuss the
choice of the variables of interest, and investigate the time-series properties of the
variables.
The paper uses yearly data on OECD countries covering a maximum time span
from 1960 to 2002. The countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. Allﬁscal
and macroeconomic data are from the OECD Economic Outlook n.73, June 2003.
Data on interest rates on 3-month Treasury bills and on 10-year government bonds
are from Global Financial Data; data on 10-year interest rates on swap contracts are
from Bloomberg. Data on ﬁnancial development are from the World Bank database
on Financial Development and Structure.8
Since the objective is to isolate the effects of ﬁscal policy on interest rates, we
use a long-term bond rate as the dependent variable. A long-term rate reﬂects mar-
ket conditions, including inﬂationary expectations, in contrast to short-term rates
which are heavily inﬂuenced by current monetary policy. We focus on the nomi-
nal interest rate on 10-year government bonds (INT10Y) because OECD countries
in the sample have been issuing this type of long-term bond for many years and,
hence, long time-series of this variable are available.9
Our key indicators of the ﬁscal stance refer to the general government and are
the primary deﬁcit as a share of GDP (PRDEF) and the public debt as a share
of GDP (GDEBT1 or GDEBT2). We use the primary deﬁcit, rather than the
total deﬁcit, because it strips out the direct effect of interest rates on expenditure,
thus better capturing autonomous changes in ﬁscal policy. We use two measures of
government debt, GDEBT1 or GDEBT2, which differ in the way in which the
variable is deﬂated. GDEBT1 is equal to the stock of public debt measured at the
end of period t-1 divided by the level of GDP in year t-1. GDEBT2 is constructed
following the approach in Levine et al (2000). It is a year-average debt stock (i.e.
the average of the stock of public debt in year t-1 and in year t divided by GDP in
year t) which insulates the debt ratio from within-year inﬂation.
Relative to most contributions in the literature our speciﬁcation is slightly un-
8Thedatabaseisavailableonlineathttp://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/ﬁnstructure/database.htm.
9The results are robust if, instead, the long-term interest rate series from the OECD, which is
an average of the interest rates of long-term bonds of different maturities, is used as the dependent
variable. The results also stand up if the spread between the 10-year government bonds interest rate
and the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate is taken as the dependent variable, and if both rates are
entered in real terms.usual, in that it includes both the deﬁcit and the debt.10 Our reason for doing so is
that, as discussed in the introduction, in theory the relationship between ﬁscal pol-
icy and interest rates may be mediated by either variable. Textbook IS-LM accounts
tend to emphasize the deﬁcit, while microfounded general equilibrium models tend
to place more weight on the stock of debt. Furthermore, even if one were specif-
ically interested in the effects of only one of these variables, it would still make
sense to control for the other. For example, given the current stock of debt, includ-
ing the deﬁcit may help controlling for the expected future path of the debt itself.
Finally, including both variables will allow us to study interactions among them.
For example, some of our speciﬁcations are designed to assess whether the effect
of deﬁcits depends on the level of debt.
To achieve identiﬁcation we mainly follow the well-worn path of adding rel-
evant control variables. The chief concern, of course, is to hold monetary policy
constant. To this end, in all our speciﬁcations we include the nominal interest rate
on 3-month Treasury bills (INT3M) and the inﬂation rate (INFL).11 We also
control for the GDP growth rate (GROWT H) and for global indicators of world
ﬁscal imbalances. We typically also have a full set of country and year dummies.
Finally, we use instrumental variablesto allow for the possible endogeneity ofﬁscal
policy associated with the government reaction function.
Since the sample period covers a variety of exchange rate regimes—including
the Bretton Woods system in the early part of the sample and Economic and Mone-
tary Union among 11 European countries in the last two years—it will be desirable
to allow for possible heteroscedasticity in the estimates, as well as checking for ro-
bustness of estimates across sub-samples. In section 3.4, we summarize results on
the presence of structural breaks for the euro countries.
10Faini (2006) and Bernoth et al. (2004) also follow a similar approach. Faini (2006) estimates
the effect of changes to the cyclically adjusted primary surplus and to the stock of public debt on real
interestratesinapanelof 11EMUcountries. Bernothetal. (2004)includenot onlythedebt-to-GDP
ratio and the deﬁcit-to-GDPratio but also theratio of government debt service to current government
revenue among the variables that explain the yield at issue spreads between DM (or Euro) and US
dollar denominated bonds issued by EU countries and Germany or the US respectively.
11In principle, this may lead us to underestimate the effect ofﬁscal shocks on interest rates, if such
shocks impact the inﬂation rate and short-term rates directly or through the monetary authority’s
reaction function (see Canzoneri et al. (2002)). When we regress the three-month interest rate on
our ﬁscal variables, however, we ﬁnd no effect. Also, we show below that in a VAR that includes
both short and long-term rates the impact effect of ﬁscal shocks on long-term rates is similar in
magnitude to the one implied by the simple static regression that controls for short-term rates.2.1 Time Series Properties and Estimation Technique
The stationarity properties of nominal interest rates (on 10-year government bonds
and 3-month Treasury bills), the inﬂation rate, and the primary balance and public
debt as a share of GDP were examined using the unit root test for panel data pro-
posed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2002).12 Table 1, part I, shows the results. While
the evidence is against stationarity when we use the sample from 1960 till 2002
(Sample A, from now on), it is in favor of stationarity if we consider data from
1975 onwards (Sample B). This holds for all variables except for the two variables
that measure the stock of public debt as a share of GDP, GDEBT1 and GDEBT2.
In fact, the test result does not allow us the reject the null hypothesis thatGDEBT1
is I 1  in both samples, but it suggests that GDEBT2 is a stationary variable in
Sample A and Sample B. This mixed evidence on the order of integration of the
series may well be due to the presence of structural breaks in the data around the
oil-shock and to the inability of the test used to distinguish it from the presence of
a unit-root. For this reason, we prefer not to choose any of the two types of results
and we will estimate our speciﬁcations for both samples, using, in each case, the
appropriate econometric technique.
For Sample A, we also test whether the nominal interest rate on 10-year gov-
ernment bonds, the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills, the inﬂation
rate, the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio, and the public debt-to-GDP ratio, as mea-
sured by GDEBT1, are cointegrated using the tests suggested by Pedroni (1999)
on the panel. The evidence allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the variables
are not cointegrated (see Table 1, part II).
Hence, based on the results shown in Table 1, we estimate our models in lev-
els. We always include country ﬁxed effects, and linear and quadratic trends or
year ﬁxed effects. When Sample A is used, we estimate the relation among the
long-term interest rate, the short-term interest rate, the inﬂation rate and the ﬁscal
policy variables by dynamic GLS, because OLS standard errors are not valid when
variables are cointegrated. More precisely, in models using Sample A, we allow
for heteroskedasticity and ﬁrst order autocorrelation in the error term and include
among the regressors the contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side vari-
ables. Boththeautocorrelationcoefﬁcientandthecoefﬁcientsofthecontemporane-
ous differences of the right-hand side variables are allowed to be country-speciﬁc.13
12When the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was applied to data for each country, the results
permitted rejection of the presence of a unit root for many, but not all, countries in the sample. The
Im, Pesaran, and Shin test is preferred given the low power of the ADF in small samples and the
desirability of adopting the same dynamic speciﬁcation for the entire panel.
13Stock and Watson (1993), and Mark and Sul (2002) suggest including contemporaneous, leads
and lags values of the differences of the right-hand side variables among the regressors and to allowWhen we use Sample B, models are estimated by OLS and standard errors are cor-
rected for heteroskedasticity. OLS estimation in levels with country ﬁxed effects
(in addition to linear and quadratic trends or year ﬁxed effects) yields consistent
estimates since we have a panel with large T.
3 Static Estimates
3.1 Linear Speciﬁcation
Table 2 columns 1-3 and 5-7 shows the results of multivariate regressions of the
nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds, on the nominal interest rate on
3-month Treasury bills, the inﬂation rate, and the primary balance and public debt
as a share of GDP. In columns 4 and 8 we also add the rate of growth of GDP among
the rhs variables. The table shows that there is a positive relationship between the
primary deﬁcit as a share of GDP and the 10-year government bonds interest rate.
Independently of the sample used and the control variables included in the esti-
mation, the coefﬁcient of the primary deﬁcit is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. The size of the coefﬁcient, however, varies across speciﬁcations
from 0.136 to 0.074, implying that a one percentage point increase in the primary
deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio is associated with an increase of the 10-year government bonds
interest rate from a maximum of 13.6 basis points to a minimum of 7.4 basis points.
On the other hand, in all but one speciﬁcation (Table 2, column 4), we do not
ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between long-term interest
rates and the stock of public debt as a share of GDP. In one speciﬁcation (Table 2,
column 1) the coefﬁcient of GDEBT1 is even negative andstatistically signiﬁcant,
suggesting that a one percentage point increase in the stock of public debt as a share
of GDP is associated with a decrease of one basis point of the 10-year government
bonds interest rate.
Note that all these results hold if we: (i) include the primary balance and the
public debt variables one at a time in our regressions; (ii) cyclically adjust the pri-
mary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio to remove the effect of the business cycle, (iii) divide
the stock of public debt by trend rather than actual GDP; (iv) use trend rather than
actual inﬂation as a control variable.14
the coefﬁcients of these variables to be country speciﬁc. Due to the number of observations required
to estimate many country’s speciﬁc coefﬁcients, we follow Bandiera et al. (1999) in including only
the contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables and allow for an AR(1) error term.
Results are, however, very similar if one includes also one lag or one lead of the differences of the
right-hand side variables among the regressors.
14To cyclically adjust the primary deﬁcit, we follow the procedure of the OECD, also described
in the Appendix of Alesina et al. (2002). We compute trend inﬂation using the Hodrick-PrescottFinally, we have also split the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio into its components.
Results (not shown but available upon request) show that both changes in primary
expenditures and in tax revenues have statistically signiﬁcant effects on long-term
interest rates and the coefﬁcients of the variables have the expected signs. When
wedecomposespendingandrevenuesintotheirrespectivecomponents, weﬁndthat
long-term interest rates react to changes in the government wage bill, transfers and
public investment and to changes in labor and business taxes. Instead, coefﬁcients
of government spending on goods and indirecttaxes do not have statistically signif-
icant coefﬁcients in our regressions. These results are consistent with the evidence
in Ardagna (2004) who ﬁnds that large ﬁscal consolidations implemented by cut-
ting sharply primary spending and, in particular, transfers and governments’ wage
bills, are associated with lower long-term interest rates and higher stock markets
prices.
3.2 Non-linearities
We are not the ﬁrst ones to ﬁnd evidence of a negative relation between the stock
of public debt and long-term interest rates. Caporale and Williams (2002) interpret
a negative coefﬁcient as due to a portfolio effect. When governments issue bonds
and investors consider them of high quality, they switch into them from bad quality
debt. The price of such bonds goes up and the yield decreases. The opposite occurs
when investors believe that governments’ bonds are risky and of low quality. More
generally, a negative coefﬁcient of the stock of public debt can be due to a liquidity
effect: in countries with very low levels of public debt, government bonds can be
less liquid and can be traded at higher transaction costs, pushing up interest rates.
What all this suggests is that the relation between long-term interest rates and the
stock of public debt can be non-linear and depend, for example, on the level of the
debt. When the stock of debt is low, an increase in its level is associated with a fall
in interest rates. However, when government debt reaches a given threshold, further
increases are associated with higher interest rates.
Following this line of argument, we investigate the presence of nonlinearities in
Table 3. Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 introduce among the regressors of Table 2 the
square terms of the primary deﬁcit and of the public debt-to-GDP ratios. We ﬁnd
evidence of non-linearities in the deﬁcit in Sample A but not in Sample B. Given
that we tend to consider estimates from the latter sample more reliable because all
variables included in the regression have the same order of integration, we do not
ﬁlter. We apply the ﬁlter to each country inﬂation rate using quarterly data and a value of   equal
to 1600. We then take the average over each year of the trend inﬂation generated with quarterly
data. Quarterly data on each country inﬂation rate are from the OECD and are available on line at
www.sourceoecd.org.put too much emphasis on this result.15 On the other hand, we ﬁnd strong evidence
of non-linearity in the public debt in both samples. An increase in the public debt-
to-GDP ratio has a negative effect on long-term interest rates if the ratio is below
62.5% for the speciﬁcation in column 1 and below 65.4% for the one in column 5.
The effect becomes positive when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above these thresholds
values. Using the coefﬁcients in column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the
ratio of government debt-to-GDP (i.e. standard deviation of GDEBT   0 26) is
associated with a decrease of the 10-year government bonds rate by 47 basis points
when government debt is at its minimum value in sample (i.e. GDEBT   0 12)
but with an increase by 114 basis points if the government debt is at its maximum
value in sample (i.e. GDEBT   1 41). Results are virtually unchanged if we
include the square terms of the primary deﬁcit and of the public debt-to-GDP ratios
one at a time.
Columns 2-4 and 6-8 check for non-linear variants to the simple quadratic term
in columns 1 and 5. In particular, the idea is to see whether the relation between
long-term interest rates and ﬁscal variables changes above a threshold level of the
ﬁscal variables. To this end, we deﬁne two dummy variables, D1 and D2  equal
to one if the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio and, respectively, the public debt-to-GDP
ratio are above their median values in the sample (and equal to zero otherwise).16
We then interact the dummy variables with the square of the difference between
the primary deﬁcit and its median value in the sample (PRDEF   PRDEF ),
and the square of the difference between public debt and its median value in the
sample (GDEBT   GDEBT ). These experiments conﬁrm that there is a clear
nonlinearityinthesizeofthedebt,while–atleastinSample B –theprimarydeﬁcit
continues to enter only linearly. Finally, in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 we check whether
the effect of deﬁcits depends on the level of debt and vice-versa. Results suggest
that increases of the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio have a bigger and statistically
signiﬁcant effect (at the 10% level or better) on long-term interest rates when the
public debt-to-GDP ratio is above its median value. Instead, we ﬁnd evidence that
the effect of public debt on interest rates depends on the level of the primary deﬁcit
in Sample A, but not in Sample B.
15Tests results presented in section 2.1 suggested that all variables included in the speciﬁcations
using Sample A, except GROWTH, are I(1) and cointegrated. GROWTH is, however, I(0).
16The median value of the primary deﬁcit to GDP ratio is -0.001 in Sample A and 0.001 in
Sample B. The median value of the government debt to GDP ratio is 0.59 in Sample A and 0.61 in
Sample B.3.3 Instrumental Variables
Table4addressesthepotentialendogeneitybetweenlong-terminterest ratesandthe
public debt. A shock to the long-term interest rate can inﬂuence the stock of public
debt by increasing interest expenses.17 Both to address this speciﬁc source of endo-
geneity, and to assuage concerns about additional omitted variables, in this table we
estimate the models considering all the regressors as endogenous. For presentation
reasons, we also show IV estimates for Sample A, but we focus on estimates for
Sample B. In fact, based on the results in Table 1 on the time series properties of
the data, IV estimates are correct only when Sample B is used. Columns 1, 2, 5,
and 6 present results for a just identiﬁed model where all variables are instrumented
by their ﬁrst lag. In columns 3 and 7, we instrument the rhs variables with their
ﬁrst and second lag, while in columns 4 and 8 we use only the second lag of the
regressors and of the left-hand side variable as instruments. The estimates of the
coefﬁcients and their standard errors are very similar to the ones obtained when we
estimate models by DGLS or OLS.
3.4 “World” ﬁscal policy
Another important issue to be examined is the impact of ﬁscal policy at the world
level. If economies are open and fully integrated with no barriers to trade or capital
mobility, if governments borrow in a common currency, and if governments’ de-
fault risks are negligible, the real interest rate in each country should depend only
on measures of worldwide aggregate ﬁscal policy, not on indicators of ﬁscal policy
in an individual country. From the individual country’s standpoint, ﬁscal expansion
is reﬂected primarily in a widening of the external current account deﬁcit and possi-
blyachangeintheexchangerate. Inthesimplestcase, anindividualcountry’sﬁscal
policy affects the interest rates it faces only to the extent that it is affects the world-
wide macroeconomic balance - i.e. it would be only the “world” primary deﬁcit and
“world” debt that matter. However, this simple theoretical result could break down
for a number of reasons: for instance, if capital mobility is limited; if goods market
mobility is limited (e.g. in cases in which exchange rate movements are associated
with changes in the relative price of tradables); if current ﬁscal deﬁcits are expected
17In principle, the 10-year interest rate can also affect the primary deﬁcit by inducing policy
makers to implement changes in their spending and tax revenues’ programs. Note, however, that the
budget for the current year is approved during the second half of the previous year and, even though
additional measures can be taken during the course of the year, they usually become effective with
some delay. Hence, the primary deﬁcit is much less likely to be an endogenous variable than the
stock of public debt. Furthermore, this type of endogeneity would likely bias our results towards
ﬁnding lower coefﬁcients, as – if anything – policymakers’ response to higher rates will be to tighten
the budget.to be ﬁnanced partly through domestic inﬂation; or if the risk of government default
is non-negligible.
It therefore seems desirable to examine empirically the hypothesis that an in-
dividual country’s ﬁscal variables affects interest rates only to the extent that they
inﬂuence “world” aggregate variables. To do this with the existing data set, we use
average values across OECD countries of the right-hand side variables as a proxy
for “world” variables. An obvious caveat is that the OECD is not, in fact, the world:
it omits a sizable part of the world economy which may have substantial aggregate
savings. At the same time, OECD aggregates do cover a substantial part of the
world economy - and an even larger share of global ﬁnancial markets.
We construct “world” variables for each regressor and introduce these “world”
indices among the rhs variables. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 5, a “world”
variable is equal to the weighted average of the variable across all countries in the
sample. Weights are based on shares of real GDP measured in PPP terms.18 Note
that the “world” variables constructed in this way have a common value across all
countries in the panel. For this reason,year dummies cannot be included as controls
in the empirical speciﬁcations in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 5.
We estimate the models of Table 5, columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, including a common
linear and quadratic trend among the regressors. Results are quite interesting. First,
contrary to the evidence on short-term real interest rates in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1990), we ﬁnd that both “world” ﬁscal policy variables and an individual country’s
ﬁscalvariablesmatterforlong-terminterestrates. Themagnitudeofthecoefﬁcients
of the “world” primary deﬁcit and “world” public debt are sizeable. An increase by
one percentage point of W PRDEF leads to an increase in the interest rate of 10-
year government bonds from a minimum of 28 basis points to a maximum of 66
basis points, and an increase by the same amount of WGDEBT raises interest
rates from a minimum of 3 basis points of a maximum of 21 basis points. The
coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional critical values. Importantly,
however, the size and the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients of PRDEF, GDEBT,
and GDEBT2 are virtually unchanged from the evidence in the previous tables.
Note also that results in Table 5 columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 do not change when we
allow the linear and quadratic trend to be country speciﬁc. This implies that little
if any of the impact of domestic deﬁcits estimated in the panel regressions reported
earlier is channelled via the world economy.19
18That is, weweightthevalueof thevariableforcountryi inyeart bytheshareof countryi’ sreal
GDP in the aggregate real GDP of the countries in the sample. The rationale for using PPP weights
in this aggregation is that this measure best captures the macroeconomic impact of the government’s
revenues and expenditures.
19We also investigated the existence of structural breaks for euro countries in 1999. In particu-
lar, for the Euro-zone economies, one might expect that: (i) indicators of ﬁscal policy in individualAn alternative formulation is to construct a “rest of the world” (ROW) average
variables that complement the individual country variables. This permits us to in-
clude year ﬁxed effects among the regressors andcheck that the evidence presented
so far still holds. Results with this formulation are reported in columns 3, 4, 7, and
8. Consistently with our previous results, individual countries’ changes in the pri-
marydeﬁcit-to-GDPratiohasalwaysapositiveandstatisticallysigniﬁcanteffect on
INT10Y, while the effect of public debt is positive (negative) when public debt is
above (below) a given threshold. As for the effect of the “world” policy indicators,
the coefﬁcient of the average value of the primary deﬁcit is no longer signiﬁcant,
while the one of public debt is still positive and signiﬁcant and its value ranges from
0.096 to 0.115. In conclusion, we read the results in Table 5 as evidence in favor
of the international ﬁnancial integration among OECD countries and the possibil-
ity that ﬁscal shocks in one country inﬂuences interest rates in others. However,
it seems that either the degree of integration is far from perfect, or that there is a
non-negligible risk that deﬁcits are reﬂected in expected inﬂation or default risk:
changes in the domestic stance of ﬁscal policy still matter for domestic long-term
interest rates beyond their effect on aggregate variables.
3.5 Financial Development
In this section we bring into the picture indicators of ﬁnancial development. The
rationale for this extension is twofold. First, ﬁnancial development obviously po-
tentially affects the level of interest rates, and if it is correlated with ﬁscal policy
it may generate a bias in our coefﬁcients. This suggests that it is worthwhile to
include ﬁnancial development as an additional control. Second, the degree of ﬁ-
nancial development may affect the responsiveness of interest rates to ﬁscal shocks.
This suggests that it may be interesting to include interactions among the ﬁscal
countries inﬂuence national interest rates before 1999 but not after, (ii) measures of aggregateﬁscal
policy are the only ones that matter after 1999. To test (i) and (ii), we deﬁned a dummy variable
PEMU equal to 1 after 1999 for the countries in our panel that adopted the euro (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands) and equal to zero otherwise. We interacted
the variable PEMU with the variables PRDEF, GDEBT1 or GDEBT2 and their square and
with W PRDEF and WGDEBT. We estimated columns 1 and 5 of Table 5 including these addi-
tional variables among the regressors. We also estimated these speciﬁcations eliminating the square
of the variables. We did notﬁnd signiﬁcant and robust evidence that suggests the presence of a struc-
tural break in the relative importance of national and world ﬁscal policy variables before and after
1999. However, we also think that our experiment is not conclusive. There are at least two caveats
that one has to consider. First, the set of countries of the European Union that potentially could have
adopted the euro is different from the one that ended up adopting the euro. Second, 1999 cannot be
the right date to identify the break if, for example, ﬁnancial markets anticipated the adoption of the
euro.variables and ﬁnancial development. The range of ﬁnancial development in this
OECD sample is comparatively limited; but even within this set of developed coun-
tries, differences in the ﬁnancial systems, and in the depth and liquidity of ﬁnancial
markets, can have important effects on the behavior of long-term interest rates.
We add among the regressors the variables used by Levine et al. (2000) to mea-
sureﬁnancialliberalization. Speciﬁcally,weusethevariable LIQUI D LI ABILIT IES
equal to the liquid liabilities of the ﬁnancial system as a share of GDP, the vari-
able PRIV AT E CREDIT, equal to the value of credits by ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries to the private sector divided by GDP, and the indicator COMMERCI AL
  CENT RAL BANK, equal to the ratio of commercial banks assets divided by
commercial bank plus central bank assets. In Table 6 we show the results obtained
when we add the ﬁrst of the three variables. An increase in ﬁnancial liberalization
leads to a decrease in the long-term interest rate and the coefﬁcient of LIQUI D
LI ABILIT IES is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. More to the point for
our purposes, the effect of changes in the primary deﬁcit and public debt-to-GDP
ratio remains virtually unchanged. Results (not shown) are along the same line if
we measure ﬁnancial development with the variables PRIV AT E CREDIT and
COMMERCI AL   CENT RAL BANK.
More interesting results are obtained by adding interaction terms between the
ﬁscal variables andﬁnancial development. Here, weﬁnd that the degree ofﬁnancial
development affects the responsiveness of interest rates to changes in the primary
deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio: in more developed ﬁnancial markets, increases in the primary
deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio attenuate the surge in long-term interest rates.20
3.6 Alternative left-hand-side variables
We now discuss the results we obtain by using a variety of alternative left-hand-side
variables.
Wehavere-estimatedtherelationbetweeninterest rates, theinﬂationrate, ﬁscal
variables and GDP growth using real rather than nominal interest rates. Ideally, one
would like to measure the long term real interest rate as the difference between the
10-year nominal interest rate and expectations of inﬂation of the next ten years.
Inﬂation’s forecasts over such a long-term time period are not available for our
panel of countries. We follow Orr et al. (1995) in proxying long-term inﬂation
expectations by trend inﬂation.21 Our results (shown in Table 7) are very similar
20The estimated coefﬁcients on PRDEF in Table 6, equations (3), (4), (7), and (8), are larger
than in the other regressions because part of the effect of PRDEF is captured by the interactive
term.
21As discussed in section 3.1, we compute trend inﬂation using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. We
apply the ﬁlter to each country inﬂation rate using quarterly data and a value of   equal to 1600. Werelatively to the ones in the speciﬁcations using nominal interest rates.
Second, we use as the dependent variable the nominal yield spread of 10-year
government bonds over 3-month Treasury bills. Once again, as Table 8 shows, our
conclusions on the effect of ﬁscal policy on long-term interest rates are unaffected
by this speciﬁcation change. Third, we use as our left-hand side variable the long-
term interest rate series published by the OECD, which is an average of the interest
rates paid on long-term government bonds. Fourth, we look at the spread between
domestic 10 year interest rates and German10 year interest rates. Again results (not
shown but available upon request) hold and they are consistent with the evidence
in Bernoth et al. (2004). They ﬁnd that debt and deﬁcits affect the spread of yields
at issue of the DM (Euro) and the dollar denominated bonds between the issuing
country and Germany or the US and that these effects are also nonlinear.
One popular left-hand-side variable in studies of the effect of ﬁscal variables is
the yield spread of 10-year government bonds over swap contracts with the same
maturity and currency denomination.22 The rationale for this choice of dependent
variable is that it measures the government’s default risk. In Table 9, we show
that ﬁscal policy also affects the 10-year interest rate on swap contracts, which
implies that ﬁscal policy shocks affect interest rates also on instruments not issued
by the government. In fact, if we use as our left-hand side variable the spread of
the 10-year government bond interest rate over the swap interest rate we ﬁnd that
the coefﬁcients of PRDEF and GDEBT are not statistically signiﬁcant. These
results may suggest that the impact of ﬁscal policy on interest rates is not likely
to be via default risk directly, but could be through expected inﬂation (which can
also be triggered by an increase in sovereign default risk), or through the demand
for loanable funds, both of which would be expected to affect the swap market in a
similar way to the long-term bond market.23
then take the average over each year of the trend inﬂation generated with quarterly data and calculate
the 10-year real interest rate at a yearly frequency by subtracting the average of trend inﬂation to the
nominal interest rate. We also start with quarterly data to compute the real 3-month interest rate as
the difference between the nominal interest rate of 3-month Treasury bills and the ex-post inﬂation
rate. We then average over the year the quarterly data.
22Swap contracts are agreements to exchange a ﬂow of interest rates payments at a ﬁxed rate for
one at a ﬂoating rate. For papers that use the interest rate of swap contracts to measure governments’
default risk see, for example, Afonso and Strauch (2003), Codogno et al. (2003), Favero et al.
(1997), and Lemmen and Goodhart (1999).
23Data on swap contracts are not available before 1988 for countries in our sample. For this
reason, we present only estimates with Sample B in Table 9.3.7 Discussion
The results we have presented show a statistically signiﬁcant positive linear re-
lationship between the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio and the 10-year government
bond interest rate. Another key result is the evidence of non-linearity in the public
debt-to-GDP ratio: increases in public debt have a statistically signiﬁcant positive
impact on long-term interest rates only in “high debt” countries.
It is useful to place these results in the context of existing empirical literature
on the effect of ﬁscal policy on interest rates. This literature has yielded mixed
results—with some studies reporting a signiﬁcant effect of ﬁscal policy on interest
rates while others ﬁnd the estimated coefﬁcients to be insigniﬁcant. As Gale and
Orszag (2004) show, the results depend on speciﬁc features of individual studies,
including the measures of ﬁscal policy and interest rates used and the method of
controlling for monetary policy and business cycle conditions.
Both ourqualitativeand quantitative resultsarebroadly consistent with existing
literature for the US and the euro area. While our estimates of the effects of changes
in the primary deﬁcit on long-term interest rates are smaller than those reported in
some previous studies, that is not surprising:24 as discussed by Gale and Orszag
(2004), papers on the US that, like ours, use current ﬁscal policy variables (rather
than projected variables) tend to ﬁnd lower or insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients: these mea-
sures understate the effects of ﬁscal variables on interest rates, as they do not fully
incorporate market expectations about future ﬁscal policy.
In contrast, studies reporting a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship be-
tween ﬁscal policy and long-term interest rates for the US capture ﬁscal policy
using measures of the projected, rather than actual, deﬁcit and debt. For example,
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002) show that a one-percentage point of GDP in-
crease in the projected future deﬁcit leads to an increase in the long-term interest
rate relative to the short-term rate of between 53 and 60 basis points. Similar re-
sults are reported by Laubach (2003) and Egen and Hubbard (2004) on the basis of
ﬁve-year-ahead projected deﬁcits and ﬁve-year-ahead forward interest rates.25
Moreover, our ﬁnding that the effect of changes in public debt are smaller than
thoseofchangesintheprimarydeﬁcitissimilartothosereportedinLaubach(2003)
and Egen and Hubbard (2004). In our linear speciﬁcations, an increase in the public
debt-to-GDP ratio by 1 percentage point increases the 10-year government bond
24As discussed above, an increase in the primary deﬁcit of 1 percent of GDP raises the 10-year
government bonds interest rate by 7.4 to 13.6 basis points (see Table 2).
25Theseresultsarealso supported byVARsestimates. Infact, Canzoneri, Cumby andDiba(2002)
ﬁnd that the ten year yield rises by 45 basis points on impact and by 40 basis points in the long run
in response to an increase in public spending by one percent of GDP; Egen and Hubbard (2004)
estimate that an increase in the projected federal deﬁcit of 1 percent of GDP leads to an increase in
the ﬁve year ahead real interest rate by 12 basis points.interest rate by at most 0.6 basis points (see Table 2 column 4). In the non-linear
regressions (see, for example, Table 3 column 1), the effect of a one-percentage-
point increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio varies from a decrease of about 2.4
basis points if the government debt-to-GDP ratio is at its minimum value in sample
(i.e. GDEBT   0 12) to an increase of 3.8 basis points if the government debt
is at its maximum value in the sample (i.e. GDEBT   1 41). Those studies also
argue that results on the deﬁcit and debt are not mutuallyinconsistent, once the role
of expectations is taken into account.
In the cross-country context, most studies have focused on the effects of ﬁscal
policy on interest rates spreads (e.g. Bernoth et al. (2004), and Codogno et al.
(2003)) and thus their results are more difﬁcult to compare with ours. An exception
is Faini (2006) who investigates the effects of changes in the primary deﬁcit-to-
GDP ratio and public debt in the euro area. He ﬁnds that changes in the primary
surplus in the euro area and at the individual country level are both important, with
the former having a stronger effect: a 1% fall in the primary surplus in the euro area
raises real long-term interest rates by about 41 basis points, while at the country
level the effect of a change in the primary surplus is only 3 basis points; changes
in the stock of public debt-to GDP ratio have no statistically signiﬁcant effect at
the country level but are statistically signiﬁcant for the euro area as a whole; and
changes to the stock of public debt are statistically signiﬁcant in countries whose
debt-to-GDP ratio is above 100%. Although our estimates differ from Faini’s, both
becausewelookatalargerpanelofcountriesandbecauseweapplydifferentecono-
metric techniques, our results are in line with his in the following dimensions. First,
we also ﬁnd evidence of non-linearity in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Second, in
our speciﬁcations, both “world” ﬁscal policy variables and an individual country’s
ﬁscal variables matter for long-term interest rates. While the magnitude of the co-
efﬁcients of the “world” primary deﬁcit and “world” public debt are sizeable in our
speciﬁcations as well, our paper ﬁnds that individual countries’ ﬁscal variables also
play an important role.
4 Dynamic Estimates
So far, our analysis has not allowed for the fact that ﬁnancial markets are forward-
looking and, hence, react not only to ﬁscal shocks in the current period, but also to
the expectation of future ﬁscal policy. As Gale and Orszag (2002) note, studies that
do not take expectations into account are biased toward ﬁnding no effect because
they do not account for the fact the ﬁnancial markets are forward-looking. More-
over, coefﬁcients in tables shown so far do not capture the full impact of changes
in ﬁscal policy on long-term interest rates, because we have not accounted for theeffects that ﬁscal variables have on long-termrates through their potential inﬂuence
on the short-term rate, the inﬂation rate and the rate of growth of GDP.
In this section, we attempt to address these issues by estimating the relationship
between long-term interest rates and ﬁscal policy variables using a vector autore-
gressive system. Papers that measures expectations through a vector autoregressive
system using US data tend to ﬁnd smaller and less robust effects than studies that
include measures of forecasted ﬁscal variables from the Congressional Budget Of-
ﬁce (CBO) or the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB). Forecasts from a
VAR are based only on past information on variables of the system, while forecasts
from the CBO or the OMB also use other information as, for example, information
on proposed changes in tax and spending legislation. To the best of our knowledge,
long-horizonforecastsoffutureﬁscal policy variablesarenot available forourlarge
panels. For this reason, we cannot follow the approach by Canzoneri, Cumby and
Diba (2002) or Laubach (2003) and we account for expectations by estimating a
VAR system.26
Our vector autoregressive system includes the 10-year government bonds in-
terest rate, the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate, the inﬂation rate, the rate of
growth of GDP, the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio and the public debt-to-GDP ratio.
We set the lag length of the system to 2 and, following Alesina et al. (2002), we
estimate the VAR on the entire panel.27 We then study the impulse response func-
tion of the long-term interest rate to a shock to the primary deﬁcit or public debt
at the time of the shock and in the following years. In order to obtain meaningful
impulse responses of the long-term rate to the ﬁscal shock, we need innovations
that are mutually orthogonal. The reduced form innovations are clearly correlated
with each other and a shock to the primary deﬁcit (public debt) is not really a shock
to this variable but a linear combination of its structural shock and shocks of the
other variables included in the system. To identify the structural primary deﬁcit and
public debt shocks, we use the Cholesky decomposition, and we orthogonalize the
innovations in several ways to check that our results are not unduly sensitive to the
order with which we choose variables to enter the system.
We consider two extreme cases. First, we assume that ﬁscal policy variables
“come ﬁrst”, followed by the inﬂation rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the 3-month
Treasury bills interest rate and the 10-year government bonds interest rate (Table
10, parts Ia and Ib). Second, we consider the case in which INT3M is ordered
ﬁrst, followed by INFL, GROWT H, PRDEF, GDEBT, and INT10Y (Table
26Renhart and Sack (2000) use the budget surplus forecasted for the following year by the OECD
from 1981 onwards. We are not aware of any study that uses panel data on OECD countries and
includes 5-year ahead and/or 10-year ahead projections of the deﬁcit and the public debt.
27To estimate the VAR, we demean the data from country and year averages to control for country
and time ﬁxed effects.10, parts IIa and IIb). Within each case, we consider both the sub-case with the
primary deﬁcit “coming before” public debt (Table 10 parts Ia and IIa) and the sub-
case with public debt “coming before” the primary deﬁcit (Table 10 parts Ib and
IIb). We also checked (and conﬁrm) that results are similar to the ones in Table 10
when we exchange the order of INFL and GROWT H.28
Table 10 displays the changes in the 10-year government bond interest rate
following a shock to the primary deﬁcit and public debt by one percentage point,
on impact and up to ten years, and the cumulative change after theﬁrst ﬁve and ten
years.
A positive shock to the ratio of primary deﬁcit-to-GDP leads to an increase
in INT10Y of 7 basis points on impact, and to a cumulative increase of 66 and
146 basis points after ﬁve and ten years, respectively (see Part I of Table 10). The
impact effect is very similar to the one we obtain in the static models, but since the
effect persists over time, the cumulative response of the long-term interest rate after
ﬁve and ten years is quite sizeable. This provides evidence in line with Feldstein
(1986)whoemphasizestheimportanceofconsideringexpectationsaboutthestance
of future ﬁscal policy in measuring the effect of the government deﬁcit on interest
rates. The coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Increases in public debt, in general, lead to lower interest rates on impact and
in a few years after the shock occurs. However, the effect becomes positive as
time goes by and the cumulative response ten years after the shock is often positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. In line with the results from the static models, the
magnitude of the effects is smaller than the one due to a change in the primary
deﬁcit. Finally, note that, while the response of INT10Y to a shock to the primary
deﬁcit is not unduly sensitive to the orthogonalization procedure, the coefﬁcients of
GDEBT are quite different in size according to the strategy used to identify the
structural shocks. This consideration calls for considerable caution in interpreting
these dynamic results.
5 Conclusions
This paper has used cross-country empirical analysis to establish that ﬁscal deﬁcits
and the accumulated public debt affect interest rates. The effects are both statisti-
cally and economically signiﬁcant, and they are robust to a variety of speciﬁcations.
These effects are non-linear, becoming stronger as a country’s debt grows and its
ﬁscal balance becomes weaker. The dynamic analysis presented also shows that the
long-run effects of sustained deﬁcits are much larger than the immediate impact of
28The use of yearly data prevents us from adopting the identiﬁcation assumptions in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), and Perotti (2002).a one-time deﬁcit. These results imply that the return to ﬁscal laxity that has taken
place in several major industrial countries in recent years is potentially worrisome.
Fiscal policy has important effects at the worldwide level, but it also has im-
portant effects at the level of the individual country. These results suggest that,
while each country’s ﬁscal imbalance has its greatest impact at home, it is also a
legitimate concern at the level of the world economy.
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1995, pp. 1-46.Table 1: Panel Integration and Cointegration Tests 
             
Part I: Integration Tests
1           
  INT10Y  INT3M  INFL  PRDEF  GDEBT1  GDEBT2 
             
Sample 1960-2002  1.38  -0.32  -1.63  -1.60  0.56  -3.34* 
             
Sample 1975-2002  -3.13*  -2.75*  -3.13*  -1.70*  1.92  -2.66* 
             
             
Part II: Cointegration Tests
2           
  ADF t-test  Panel ADF         
            
Sample 1960-2002  -3.67*  -6.28*         
             
Notes: 
1. The panel integration tests are based are on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2000). The test is distributed N(0,1). The country-specific ADF test includes one-lag and a time trend. * 
indicates that the null-hypothesis that the time series is I(1) is rejected at the 5% level. 
2. The ADF t-test is based on Pedroni (1997). The Panel ADF is based on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2000). Both tests are distributed N(0,1) and are one-sided: a level a test of the null 
is rejected if the statistics in the table is < za where za is the a standard normal quantile. * indicates that the null-hypothesis that variables are not cointegrated is rejected at the 5% 
level. Cointegrating vector: INT10Y, INT3M, INFL, PRDEF, GDEBT 
3. INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10-year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; INFL = inflation rate; PRDEF = primary deficit as a 
share of GDP; GDEBT1 = stock of public debt measured at the end of period t-1 divided by the level of GDP in year t-1; GDBET2 = average of the stock of public debt in year t-1 
and in year t divided by GDP in year t.  Table 2: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – Linear specification 
  Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1960-2002 
Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1975-2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  DGLS  DGLS  DGLS  DGLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
                 
INT3M  0.629  0.524  0.389  0.390  0.647  0.521  0.436  0.443 
  (29.48)**  (23.57)**  (13.34)**  (13.49)**  (25.03)**  (14.64)**  (11.74)**  (12.23)**
INFL  0.127  0.120  0.128  0.141  0.146  0.149  0.160  0.168 
  (5.57)**  (7.96)**  (5.93)**  (6.77)**  (5.53)**  (5.06)**  (6.36)**  (6.71)** 
PRDEF  0.128  0.113  0.106  0.101  0.136  0.109  0.074  0.081 
  (4.79)**  (5.37)**  (5.05)**  (5.06)**  (5.90)**  (4.86)**  (3.79)**  (4.08)** 
GDEBT  -0.010  -0.005  -0.0001  0.006  0.0001  0.003  0.002  0.005 
  (-2.64)**  (-1.53)  (-0.04)  (1.79)*  (0.04)  (0.87)  (0.66)  (1.48) 
GROWTH        0.143        0.082 
        (5.42)**        (2.81)** 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trend and Trend
2  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Year Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2          0.90  0.92  0.94  0.94 
N. of obs.  413  413  413  413  373  373  373  373 
Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. GROWTH = real GDP growth rate. T-statistic in parenthesis. Columns 1-4 estimated by dynamic 
GLS,  allowing  for  heterosckedasticity  and  country-specific  first  order  autocorrelation  coefficient  in  the  error  term,  and  including  among  the  regressors  country  specific 
contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables. Columns 5-8 estimated by OLS and T-statistics are corrected for heterosckedasticity. See also notes to Table 1. Table 3: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – Nonlinearities 
  Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1960-2002 
Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1975-2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  DGLS  DGLS  DGLS  DGLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
INT3M  0.387  0.391  0.384  0.374  0.449  0.450  0.444  0.457 
  (14.55)**  (14.91)**  (14.29)**  (13.91)**  (12.58)**  (12.59)**  (12.43)**  (12.48)**
INFL  0.156  0.168  0.161  0.189  0.173  0.171  0.174  0.168 
  (7.49)**  (8.49)**  (8.31)**  (9.59)**  (7.13)**  (6.92)**  (6.99)**  (6.74)** 
PRDEF  0.116  0.095  0.126  0.036  0.093  0.105  0.142  0.127 
  (5.54)**  (3.43)**  (3.94)**  (1.19)  (4.38)**  (3.73)**  (4.00)**  (3.64)** 
GDEBT  -0.030  -0.007  -0.009  -0.004  -0.017  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002 
  (-3.80)**  (-1.62)  (-2.15)**  (-1.07)  (-1.50)  (-0.29)  (-0.79)  (-0.33) 
GROWTH  0.124  0.139  0.127  0.156  0.087  0.086  0.088  0.087 
  (4.75)**  (5.48)**  (5.20)**  (6.14)**  (2.86)**  (2.84)**  (2.91)**  (2.87)** 
PRDEF
2  0.813        -0.140       
  (2.55)**        (-0.37)       
GDEBT
2  0.024        0.013       
  (5.62)**        (1.99)**       
(PRDEF- PRDEF
*)
2 *D1    0.950  -1.303  1.328    -0.454  -1.802  -0.615 
    (2.10)**  (1.62)  (2.90)**    (-0.79)  (-1.57)  (-1.05) 
(GDEBT- GDEBT
*)
2 *D2    0.030  0.029  0.019    0.013  0.015  0.019 
    (4.86)**  (5.31)**  (2.92)**    (1.65)*  (1.83)*  (2.18)** 
(PRDEF- PRDEF
*)
2 *D2      1.980        1.234   
      (3.71)**        (1.65)*   
(GDEBT- GDEBT
*)
2 *D1        0.029        -0.013 
        (3.43)**        (-1.29) 
N. of obs.  413  413  413  413  373  373  373  373 
Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. PREDEF*=Median PRDEF. GDEBT*=Median 
GDEBT. D1=1 if PRDEF>PRDEF*, 0 otherwise. D2=1 if GDEBT>GDEBT*, 0 otherwise. T-statistic in parenthesis. In columns 1 and 5, the values of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
above which an additional increase in the debt has a positive effect on interest rates are 62.5% and 65.4% respectively. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. Table 4: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – Instrumental variables 
  Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1960-2002 
Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1975-2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 
                 
INT3M  0.352  0.391  0.356  0.621  0.349  0.387  0.327  0.539 
  (4.42)**  (4.92)**  (4.58)**  (3.62)**  (4.63)**  (4.89)**  (5.16)**  (3.72)** 
INFL  0.308  0.310  0.303  0.288  0.320  0.321  0.279  0.292 
  (4.48)**  (4.80)**  (4.82)**  (2.22)**  (4.65)**  (4.87)**  (4.79)**  (2.46)** 
PRDEF  0.049  0.107  0.071  0.158  0.070  0.108  0.068  0.161 
  (1.91)*  (3.68)**  (2.76)**  (2.87)**  (2.84)**  (3.86)**  (2.90)**  (2.87)** 
GDEBT  0.002  -0.043  -0.033  -0.070  0.002  -0.035  -0.020  -0.064 
  (0.41)  (-3.10)**  (-2.30)**  (-3.11)**  (0.45)  (-2.24)**  (-1.44)  (-2.61)** 
GROWTH  -0.119  -0.048  -0.025  0.101  -0.082  -0.043  -0.055  -0.229 
  (-1.07)  (-0.44)  (-0.25)  (0.41)  (-0.74)  (-0.38)  (-0.62)  (-0.86) 
PRDEF
2    -1.312  -0.397  -3.120    -1.123  0.270  -3.261 
    (-1.50)  (-0.53)  (-1.55)    (-1.26)  (0.38)  (-1.30) 
GDEBT
2    0.030  0.024  0.049    0.023  0.013  0.040 
    (3.74)**  (2.94)**  (3.90)**    (2.56)*  (1.64)*  (2.96)** 
N. of obs.  413  413  399  393  367  367  360  357 
Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. Instruments in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 are first lag of 
rhs variables. Instruments in columns 3 and 7 are first and second lag of rhs variables. Instruments in columns 4 and 8 are second lag of the rhs and lhs variables. T-statistic in 
parenthesis. The values of the debt-to-GDP ratio above which an additional increase in the debt has a positive effect on interest rates are 71.7%, 68.7%, 71.4% in columns 2 – 4, 
and 76.1%, 76.9%, 80% in columns 6 – 8. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. Table 5: World fiscal policy 
  Dep. var. INT10Y- Sample 1960-2002  Dep. var. INT10Y-Sample 1975-2002 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
  DGLS IV DGLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
 
INT3M  0.364 0.367 0.354 0.406  0.440 0.415 0.454 0.379
  (12.23)** (3.67)** (11.86)** (4.35)**  (11.16)** (4.07)** (10.22)** (3.94)**
INFL  0.176 0.322 0.166 0.362  0.173 0.283 0.195 0.365
  (7.03)** (3.91)** (6.99)** (4.90)**  (6.58)** (2.89)** (6.58)** (4.84)**
PRDEF  0.134 0.118 0.127 0.131  0.103 0.122 0.107 0.131
  (4.99)** (3.07)** (5.50)** (3.13)**  (4.36)** (3.57)** (3.69)** (3.15)**
GDEBT  -0.051 -0.052 -0.018 -0.031  -0.014 -0.045 -0.016 -0.030
  (-5.66)** (-2.49)** (-2.15)** (-1.99)**  (-1.17) (-2.34)** (-1.35) (-1.80)*
GROWTH  0.105 -0.050 0.126 -0.042  0.094 -0.071 0.095 -0.046
  (3.31)** (-0.39) (4.37)** (-0.33)  (2.87)** (-0.55) (2.62)** (-0.37)
PRDEF
2  -0.105 -1.142 0.068 -1.538  -0.290 -0.997 -0.188 -1.381
  (-0.28) (-1.05) (0.23) (-1.75)  (-0.68) (-0.86) (-0.49) (-1.48)
GDEBT
2  0.036 0.034 0.025 0.029  0.012 0.028 0.017 0.025
  (6.74)** (3.00)** (5.41)** (3.24)**  (1.68)* (2.60)** (2.42)** (2.55)**
WINT3M  0.597 0.751 -0.429 0.410  0.547 0.982 0.309 0.188
  (12.21)** (1.63) (-2.19)* (0.76)  (7.80)** (2.12)** (1.13) (0.33)
WINFL  0.066 -0.125 0.145 0.493  -0.157 -0.390 0.286 0.513
  (1.19) (-0.58) (0.86) (1.19)  (-1.41) (-2.47)** (1.05) (0.98)
WPRDEF  0.282 0.657 -0.040 0.346  0.405 0.566 0.079 0.136
  (3.68)** (2.35)** (-0.18) (0.89)  (6.70)** (2.60)** (0.32) (0.36)
WGDEBT  0.031 0.088 0.096 0.114  0.116 0.206 0.112 0.115
  (1.46) (1.77)* (4.27)** (3.29)**  (3.96)** (2.31)** (3.62)** (2.09)**
WGROWTH  0.244 0.554 -0.103 0.046  0.118 0.543 0.074 -0.437
  (3.30)** (0.81) (-0.59) (0.07)  (1.41) (1.01) (0.34) (-0.55)
Trend and Trend
2  Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes No  No
Year Dummies  No  No Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes
N. of obs.  413 413 413 413 373 367 373 367
Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, a  “W” variable is 
equal to the weighted average of the variable across all countries in the sample. In columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, a “W” variable is equal to a weighted average of the variable across all 
countries in the sample except the value of the variable for country i. Weights are based on real GDP. Instruments in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also 
notes to Tables 1 and 2 and section 3.4. Table 6: Financial development 
  Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1960-2002 
Dep. var. INT10Y 
Sample 1975-2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  DGLS  IV  DGLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
                 
INT3M  0.368  0.371  0.406  0.376  0.436  0.400  0.438  0.386 
  (13.00)**  (3.90)**  (15.01)**  (3.95)**  (10.89)**  (4.41)**  (11.63)**  (4.14)** 
INFL  0.162  0.297  0.135  0.275  0.169  0.332  0.163  0.365 
  (7.23)**  (3.64)**  (5.83)**  (3.30)**  (5.87)**  (3.70)**  (5.62)**  (3.92)** 
PRDEF  0.150  0.126  0.319  0.318  0.129  0.150  0.253  0.285 
  (6.35)**  (3.92)**  (5.87)**  (4.08)**  (5.36)**  (4.86)**  (4.02)**  (3.66)** 
GDEBT  -0.024  -0.035  -0.039  -0.052  -0.025  -0.059  -0.039  -0.063 
  (-1.95)*  (-1.66)*  (-2.69)**  (-2.41)**  (-1.61)  (-1.95)*  (-2.12)*  (-1.85)* 
GROWTH  0.147  -0.030  0.125  -0.058  0.064  0.009  0.054  0.006 
  (4.44)**  (-0.28)  (3.51)**  (-0.54)  (2.05)**  (0.07)  (1.83)*  (0.05) 
PRDEF
2  0.573  -1.232  0.248  -1.519  -0.344  -1.115  -0.433  -1.371 
  (1.70)*  (-1.30)  (0.81)  (-1.65)*  (-0.91)  (-1.21)  (-1.10)  (-1.46) 
GDEBT
2  0.022  0.024  0.020  0.026  0.015  0.036  0.020  0.046 
  (2.31)**  (1.87)*  (2.26)**  (1.94)*  (1.59)  (1.95)*  (1.84)*  (2.36)** 
LIQUID LIABILITIES  -0.012  -0.022  -0.033  -0.037  -0.022  -0.028  -0.030  -0.018 
  (-3.11)**  (-3.51)**  (-3.30)**  (-3.05)**  (-5.44)**  (-4.79)**  (-3.27)**  (-1.50) 
LIQUID LIABILITIES       -0.230  -0.255      -0.170  -0.159 
*PRDEFY      (3.08)**  (3.06)**      (2.61)**  (-1.90)* 
LIQUID LIABILITIES       0.021  0.017      0.010  -0.008 
*GDEBTY      (1.98)**  (1.50)      (1.16)  (0.74) 
N. of obs.  317  317  317  317  280  275  280  275 
Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. LIQUID LIABILITIES = 
(currency + demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial)/GDP. Instruments in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 7: Long-term real interest rates 
  Dep. var. RINT10Y  
Sample 1960-2002 
Dep. var. RINT10Y  
Sample 1975-2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  DGLS  IV  DGLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
                 
RINT3M  0.418  0.702  0.399  0.635  0.370  0.659  0.348  0.502 
  (19.21)**  (6.82)**  (13.74)**  (5.51)**  (11.16)**  (8.33)**  (7.67)**  (6.50)** 
PRDEF  0.108  0.139  0.115  0.128  0.074  0.105  0.072  0.088 
  (4.09)**  (3.27)**  (4.42)**  (2.78)**  (3.12)**  (2.71)**  (2.99)**  (2.19)** 
GDEBT  -0.030  -0.056  -0.034  -0.050  -0.024  -0.031  -0.023  -0.017 
  (-3.52)**  (-2.64)**  (-4.14)**  (-2.23)**  (-1.65)*  (-1.83)*  (-1.56)  (-1.01) 
GROWTH  0.068  0.256  -0.002  0.288  0.037  0.120  0.035  0.159 
  (2.35)**  (1.52)  (-0.07)  (1.83)*  (1.19)  (0.92)  (1.07)  (1.23) 
PRDEF
2  -0.573  -1.370  -0.692  -0.812  -1.028  -1.158  -0.951  0.017 
  (-1.54)  (-1.45)  (-1.91)*  (-0.77)  (-1.73)*  (-1.20)  (-1.52)  (0.02) 
GDEBT
2  0.023  0.042  0.025  0.038  0.024  0.027  0.023  0.018 
  (4.46)**  (3.81)**  (4.92)**  (3.17)**  (2.82)**  (2.77)**  (2.64)**  (1.75)* 
INFL
      -0.049  -0.094      -0.036  -0.212 
      (-1.69)  (-1.16)      (-0.86)  (-2.73)** 
N. of obs.  413  413  413  413  373  367  373  367 
Notes: RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills. GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 
in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. Instruments in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to Tables 
1 and 2. 
 Table 8: The term-structure of interest rates 
  Dep. var. (INT10Y-INT3M) 
Sample 1960-2002 
Dep. var. (INT10Y-INT3M) 
Sample 1975-2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  DGLS  IV  DGLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
                 
PRDEF  0.159  0.152  0.142  0.151  0.108  0.141  0.108  0.142 
  (4.29)**  (3.38)**  (3.78)**  (3.21)**  (3.33)**  (3.20)**  (3.28)**  (3.13)** 
GDEBT  -0.068  -0.067  -0.068  -0.066  -0.029  -0.049  -0.029  -0.050 
  (-5.04)**  (-4.50)**  (-5.07)**  (-4.46)**  (-1.91)*  (-2.86)**  (-1.90)*  (-2.84)** 
GROWTH  0.008  -0.045  0.001  -0.039  0.130  -0.028  0.129  -0.031 
  (0.20)  (-0.31)  (0.03)  (-0.30)  (2.60)**  (-0.19)  (2.48)**  (-0.22) 
PRDEF
2  -1.027  -2.982  -0.536  -2.893  -1.164  -2.887  -1.156  -2.951 
  (-1.90)*  (-2.50)**  (-0.97)  (-2.24)**  (-2.05)*  (-2.32)*  (-2.03)*  (-2.16)* 
GDEBT
2  0.045  0.041  0.045  0.041  0.022  0.032  0.021  0.033 
  (5.63)**  (4.72)**  (5.79)**  (4.41)**  (2.34)**  (3.08)**  (2.30)**  (2.84)** 
INFL     -0.047  -0.015      -0.005  0.013 
      (-1.51)  (-0.28)      (-0.16)  (0.19) 
N. of obs.  413  413  413  413  373  367  373  367 
Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. Instruments in columns 2, 
4, 6, and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. Table 9: Alternative left-hand side variables 
  Sample 1975-2002 
  Dep. var. SW10Y  Dep. var. (INT10Y-SW10Y) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
INT3M  0.393  0.292  0.018  0.074 
  (9.76)**  (1.66)  (1.23)  (0.94) 
INFL  0.118  0.325  0.005  -0.038 
  (1.95)*  (1.19)  (0.20)  (0.32) 
PRDEF  0.099  0.129  -0.004  0.020 
  (4.49)**  (2.33)**  (-0.43)  (0.93) 
GDEBT  -0.003  0.015  0.004  0.002 
  (0.24)  (0.51)  (0.66)  (0.23) 
GROWTH  0.023  -0.080  0.027  0.076 
  (0.97)  (0.58)  (2.68)**  (1.46) 
PRDEF
2  -0.282  -0.653  -0.045  -0.394 
  (0.91)  (0.73)  (-0.26)  (0.97) 
GDEBT
2  -0.005  -0.012  0.001  0.000 
  (-0.78)  (-1.04)  (0.30)  (0.06) 
N. of obs.  190  189  190  189 
Notes: SW10Y = interest rate of 10-year swap contracts. GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. T-
statistic in parenthesis. Instruments in columns 2, and 4 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. Table 10: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy – Dynamic estimates 
Sample 1975-2002               
  0 year  1 year  2 years  5 years  10 years  Sum 0 to 5 
years 
Sum 0 to 10 
years 
Part Ia               
               
PRDEF  0.068**  0.086**  0.115**  0.168**  0.228**  0.661**  1.456** 
GDEBT  -0.038**  -0.091**  -0.098**  -0.036**  0.06**  -0.364**  -0.151** 
               
Part Ib                
               
PRDEF  0.085**  0.126**  0.158**  0.184**  0.202**  0.82**  1.52** 
GDEBT  -0.024**  -0.071**  -0.073**  -0.0073**  0.092**  -0.235**  0.089** 
               
Part IIa                
               
PRDEF  0.08**  0.121**  0.157**  0.201**  0.243**  0.844**  1.69** 
GDEBT  -0.006**  -0.012**  -0.003**  0.055**  0.14**  0.081**  0.57** 
               
Part IIb                
               
PRDEF  0.082**  0.124**  0.158**  0.184**  0.201**  0.819**  1.52** 
GDEBT  0.006**  0.007**  0.021**  0.083**  0.17**  0.21**  0.80** 
               
Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT2. Country dummies and year dummies included. ** indicates that coefficient is inside the 95 percent confidence band. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 